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DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN BRAZIL  
ADVANCES IN ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS  
AND REGRESSION IN CIVIL – MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
Thomas C. Bruneau1 
 
 Introduction  
The doyen of democratization studies and American policies in support of 
democratization globally, Professor Larry Diamond, recently published an article in 
The American Interest with the title “The Liberal Democratic Order in Crisis” in 
which the header correctly states the main message of the article.  “We are at a 
tipping point. Around the world, many democracies are hanging by a threat and 
autocrats are preparing more savage assaults on what remains of freedom.” 2 The 
focus in this chapter is on Brazil, and mainly on how democratic politics ironically 
has led to vast improvements in accountability mechanisms while leading to 
regression in civil – military relations. It is important to emphasize from the 
beginning of this chapter that the regression in civil-military relations, with 
implications for democracy, is due mainly to the dynamics of democratic politics and 
not the supposed nefarious plans and plots of the Brazilian Armed Forces.  3 
 The Constitution of 1988  
To understand the current political situation in Brazil, including 
accountability mechanisms and civil-military relations, one must begin with the 
Constitution of 1988 that marked the formal consolidation of democracy following  
twenty-one years (1964-85) under a military regime.  Scholars who study the 
process whereby the Constitution of 1988 was formulated and the resulting 
document are extremely critical.  In my writing I argue that the Constitution did not 
represent an “elite settlement” ensuring democratic consolidation, as was the case 
in Spain, for example. 4 Law professor, Keith S. Rosenn, states the following: “The 
process by which Brazil’s 1988 Constitution was adopted practically assured that 
the end product would be a hodgepodge of inconsistent and convoluted provisions.” 
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5  Despite 3 years of work resulting in a document of 245 articles and 70 transitional 
provisions, the 559 framers were unable to resolve whether Brazil would be a 
monarchy or republic, and if the latter, a presidential or parliamentary regime.  
These fundamental decisions were left for a referendum in 1993 that favored a 
presidential republic.  The framers of the constitution, which were the 559 members 
of the Brazilian Congress, maintained intact both the institutional defects of the 
political system and the extensive prerogatives of the armed forces that governed 
Brazil between 1964 and 1985.  Whereas the institutional defects of the political 
system continue until the present the accountability institutions have become 
robust and active. And, the prerogatives of the armed forces were diminished, but 
most recently increased depending on the political situation that is dominated by 
civilians.   
 Although the Constitution of 1988 included a great many items that could 
lead to an improved socio – economic situation for Brazilians, it changed nothing 
regarding the political institutions that put those 559 politicians into the position of 
writing the constitution, and have made only most minimal changes in the 
intervening 28 years.  As Rosenn states “The constituent assembly also did nothing 
to reform the malfunctioning of the political party system, which is one of the 
world’s worst.” 6 They did not establish a minimum number of votes for a party to 
be recognized, resulting in the current situation with 35 political parties at the 
national level with 19 having deputies in the lower house, the Câmara. They did not 
change the open – list system of proportional representation in which each state is a 
single, and at – large multi – member district.  They did not change the gross 
misrepresentation whereby all states, and the federal district, have three senators 
or the provision stipulating that all states, regardless of population, would have a 
minimum of eight and a maximum of seventy deputies in the Câmara. 
 There was supposed to be a wholesale revision of the Constitution in 1993 
that would require only an absolute majority of the deputies.  That revision never 
happened.  Instead, there have been piecemeal revisions. In reviewing the various 
initiatives to revise the constitution between 1988 and today, they amount to very 
little.  This is the consensus view of recognized experts on the issue including David 
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Fleischer, Alfredo Montero, Timothy Power, and Keith Rosenn.  The Constitution of 
1988 was full of contradictions. The issue of parliamentary vs. presidential form of 
government was never fully resolved, neither in the constituent assembly nor after. 
On the one hand the constitution gave the congress a role in approving annual 
budgets and allowed them to overrule presidential vetoes with absolute majorities 
rather than a two-thirds vote. On the other hand, it gave the presidency the 
exclusive right to initiate and execute annual budgets and to force 45 – day limits on 
the congress to review bills defined as “urgent” by the president, the power to 
appoint a cabinet, subject to Senate approval, and the power to issue executive 
decrees (medidas provisórias) which had the force of law while congress had 30 days 
to review the measure. 7 Post – 1990 presidents utilized these measures, and others, 
to govern.   
 Politics as Usual  
Even with these gimmicks, the need to assemble a coalition, since no 
president since the first directly elected, President Collor,  in 1989, has belonged to 
a party with a majority in either house of congress, all presidents would have to 
obtain the support of other parties.  Brazil has one of, if not the most fractured, party 
system of any democracy. This form of government, commonly called coalitional 
presidentialism (presidencialismo de coalizão), could, and did, easily evolve into 
corruption. The most famous, but not the only, corruption scandal of the President 
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva –Lula (2002 – 2010) administration was the “big monthly” 
(as in big monthly payments to members of congress to support his government’s 
policies in the congress), mensalão scandal.  Alfred Montero has this to say on this 
topic. “The need to engage in vote – buying emerged from the limited options the 
Lula administration had for composing the same kind of legislative coalition that 
Cardoso [President, 1995-2003] enjoyed.” 8  Several top Workers’ Party (PT) 
officials were implicated in this vote – buying scheme.  The scandal ultimately led to 
the convictions of twenty-five people, including Lula’s former chief of staff, José 
Dirceu de Oliveira e Silva, who has more recently been sentenced to 23 years in jail 
in the Lava Jato corruption scheme. There are so many corruption scandals 
currently in play in the investigation and sentencing phases, that only the experts 
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can keep straight the modalities of Mensalão, Lava Jato, Petrolão, Zelotes, and 
Operation Aequalis to mention only the biggest and most recent. So far the wave of 
illegal, extralegal, and simply corrupt practices have resulted in the impeachment of 
President Rousseff, the conviction of ex-President Lula, the conviction of 84 persons 
for crimes associated with Lava Jato, and dozens more in other corruption scandals. 
While not all of the crimes involve politicians, most of them do, and virtually all of 
them involve sources of funds, as in Petrobras, under the control of the Brazilian 
State, and thus of necessity involve politicians. 9 
 It must be acknowledged that corruption is nothing new in Brazil.  In fact, 
according to the late Samuel Huntington in his influential Political Order in Changing 
Societies corruption was seen in positive terms in the process of modernization, and  
Huntington called specific, and positive, attention to Brazil.  Further, there is a very 
influential article published in 1990 in the important Revista de Administração 
Pública of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas by Anna Maria Campos that argues in great 
detail why there is no concept or meaning for the term “accountability” in 
Portuguese. Most Brazilian and foreign authors refer to the Brazilian propensity to 
use “angles” or “gimmicks”, jeitinhos, to get around laws. Or, as was said in positive 
terms of a mayor of São Paulo, he robs but he accomplishes things. Rouba mas faz. 
 Accountability Mechanisms to the Fore 
 And, while politics has not changed, including the use of corruption to 
govern, what is now permissible in politics and business in general in Brazil is 
changing.  There is no single cause for the change, and I have identified at least five. 
 First, the 1988 Constitution created, or recreated, a large spectrum of 
oversight and investigation mechanisms, and these have been expanded in number 
during the intervening 29 years. Today they include the Comptroller General, the 
Accounting Tribunal, the Federal Police, the Public Ministry, and the courts.  There is 
a huge literature on these institutions in both Portuguese and English, and the 
approach that I find most convincing to explain their increasing influence, 
culminating in the current wave of imprisonments, is that of Sérgio Praça and 
Matthew M. Taylor who demonstrate that the capacity of these institutions 
increases not by a single event or factor, but through bureaucratic interaction. 10 The 
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increase in capacity is thus contingent and interactive.  In short, these oversight, 
investigatory, and punishment institutions can only be understood in a specific 
national and international context, which is why I include the following four factors.  
 Second, whereas in the past, the main weakness of the accountability 
mechanisms was the inability or unwillingness of the courts, and especially the 
Supreme Court, to process and convict individuals, today this is changing due to 
personalities and the gradual modification of processes similar to those noted in the 
prior paragraph.  This change is best highlighted by the actions of Judge Sérgio Moro 
of Curitiba who has taken the lead in the Lava Jato scandal. He is extremely active 
not only in pursuing corruption, but also in writing on the importance of plea - 
bargaining and the Italian experience in countering the mafia. He is also something 
of a hero in Brazil today as described in Watts’ article.  In addition to the changes in 
this point, the addition of plea bargaining is also a key mechanism for accountability.  
 Third, much of the momentum to impeach President Rousseff is related to 
allegation of corruption involving the Workers’ Party, and was established by the 
information provided by Senator Delcídio do Amaral, who was the leader of the 
party in the Senate. He was arrested, and in plea -  bargaining (delação premiada)  
he provided information on the spread of corruption throughout the Brazilian 
government.  Those familiar with criminal law in the United States emphasize that 
plea - bargaining is the single most important mechanism for gathering evidence on 
white - collar crime. Plea- bargaining was established in Brazil only in 2013 with law 
12,850/2013. I have been informed by Brazilian lawyers involved in the 
introduction of plea – bargaining that it was one of several laws that were required 
for Brazil to reach OECD standards.  Since June 2015 there was a Co-Operation 
Agreement in place between Brazil and the OECD, which has been followed by an 
OECD-Brazil Programme of Work. Ironically enough it was implemented by 
President Rousseff who was later impeached.  11 
 Fourth, Brazil’s population of over 200 million is increasingly invested in the 
system. An important indicator of this vesting is their paying taxes. According to one 
source, in 2013 over 50% of those who declared income, paid income tax, whereas a 
decade earlier only 36% paid income tax. 12 Just as important, according to data 
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analyzed by the Instituto Brasileiro de Planejamento e Tributação, of the thirty 
countries where taxes are the highest, Brazil is the worst in terms of return to the 
population in investments in the quality of life.  
 Fifth, Brazilians are today are keenly aware of the low return on investment 
for their high taxes. Indeed, the huge anti – government demonstrations in June 
2013 were mainly caused by this awareness of high taxes, mediocre public services 
in health, education, and transportation, while the government invested massively 
in stadiums and other infrastructure for the world prestige sporting events, the 
World Cup in soccer in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016.  In addition to all – pervasive 
radio and television stations there is today extremely high penetration by social 
media. According to comScore, which claims to be the global leader in digital 
analysis, Brazil leads the world with a 99.9% reach of social media. And, with 8.8 
hours of use in the month of June 2015, Brazil is the world leader in that similar data 
for Europe, for example, is 6.1 hours, and the U.S. 5.2 hours. 13 
 In sum, traditional politics, in which the lubricant is public funds, has now 
encountered a wide spectrum of accountability mechanisms, supported by 
processes and attitudes, which no longer tolerate the traditional lackadaisical 
approach to ethics in politics.  While the incentives to reform politics are not as 
obvious they are nevertheless present in the expectations of the Brazilian 
population and international organizations.  
 Prerogatives of the Brazilian Armed Forces 
Both Rosenn and I detail the extensive prerogatives of the armed forces that 
resulted from the very long and negotiated transition from military to civilian rule 
and the reliance of President Sarney on the armed forces during his five year tenure 
(1985 – 90).  The most extensive work on this topic, however, is found in Alfred 
Stepan’s Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone where he 
demonstrates, by describing 11 prerogatives, that Brazil had little progressed 
between military and civilian rule. 14 More recently, twenty – six years after Stepan 
published his book, my colleague, Scott D. Tollefson and I, demonstrate that the 
prerogatives that were mainly high when Stepan wrote became either low or 
moderate.  Some of the main developments of the process whereby the prerogatives 
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were diminished or eliminated include the creation of a civilian – led ministry of 
defense in June 1999, which resulted in the decrease of military – led ministries 
from six to zero, and a large package of laws in 2011 which further delimited and 
restricted the autonomy of the armed forces. Illustrative of the change from the 
military regime was the elimination of the National Information Service, (Serviço 
Nacional de Informações SNI), which was the intelligence arm of the military regime, 
by President Collor in 1990, and the creation, only after nine years, of the Brazilian 
Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência ABIN).  ABIN is prohibited 
from conducting intercepts, has a minimal budget, and lacks a direct link to decision 
– makers.  In short, the politicians had incentives to diminish the influence and roles 
of the armed forces, thereby increasing their own.  We describe the progress on 
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Source: Adapted from Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the 
Southern Cone (Princeton University Press, 1988): pages 93-114, especially table 7.1 and 
page 103.  “Close to high” for 1969-1972 is interpreted as “high”.  For 1985-1987, 
variables 8 and 10 “were reduced” (page 103) according to Stepan, and are placed here in 
the moderate category.  Authors’ update based on documents and interviews in Brazil 
with civilians and military officers in 2012 and 2013, and by e-mail in 2014.   
 
Utilizing a conceptual framework that includes not only democratic civilian 
control, as exemplified by the prerogatives listed above, but also military 
effectiveness, Scott D. Tollefson and I document how control had been asserted, by 
diminishing the prerogatives. Military effectiveness, however, had not been 
achieved. 15 We demonstrate that Brazil lacks a national security strategy, does not 
have a functioning joint staff that could interface with the civilian led ministry of 
defense, and the country invests only 1.29% of GDP in defense, 73% of which goes 
to salaries and pensions. This minimal military effectiveness is not a popular or 
political issue, however, since Brazil is situated in a “zone of peace” with no obvious 
enemies.  For example, the National Defense Strategy of 2008 states in the 
Introduction “Brazil is a peaceful country, by tradition and conviction. It lives in 
peace with its neighbors.”  And, in the same defense strategy, in the guidelines 
section, “Presently, Brazil does not have any enemies.” 16 
 The lack of effectiveness would not matter if Brazil did not harbor 
aspirations to be recognized as a global power.  It is commonplace to state, as 
President Lula did in 2003, that Brazil is ready to “assume its greatness”.  There is a huge 
outpouring of reports and documents giving evidence of Brazil as a regional, if not 
global, actor, a BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), an important interlocutor with 
the United States, and more. For example, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert 
Gates and Brazilian Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobin, signed a Security of Military 
Information Agreement on November 21, 2010.  Significant and recent U.S. government 
documents highlight Brazil’s importance.  As President Barack Obama’s National 
Security Strategy stated, “We welcome Brazil’s leadership and seek to move beyond 
dated North-South divisions to pursue progress on bilateral, hemispheric, and global 
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issues” 17 In their most recent twenty-year prospective, the U.S. National Intelligence 
Council states, “Brazil will play an outsized role on the region’s future. Its resources and 
scale could offer benefits and insulation others lack” 18 In addition to the Congressional 
Research Service, which issues periodic reports on Brazil, many important U.S. and 
European think tanks and non-governmental organizations publish reports heralding 
Brazil’s emergence into greatness. The issue that any country, even Brazil with the 5th 
largest population and 5th largest area, can realistically aspire to global status without 
credible “hard power” is responded to in the negative by many observers. 19 
Regression in Military Prerogatives  
Currently, nothing has changed regarding military effectiveness.  If anything, 
with the economic crisis the armed forces have fewer resources that results in fewer 
ships, airplanes, and tanks available for deployments.  20 What has changed, 
however, is regression concerning the prerogatives, or democratic civilian control.  
Today, for the first time since its founding in June 1999, the Ministry of Defense is 
headed by an army general.  The Secretariat for Institutional Security, GSI (Gabinete 
de Segurança Institucional) has been recreated, and is also headed by an army 
general, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency, ABIN (Agência Brasileira de 
Inteligência) is under the GSI. Another army general heads the Civilian Household 
(Casa Civil) of the President of Brazil. And, another army general is the president of 
the Indian Foundation (FUNAI).   In addition to these important changes in 
leadership of key security and domestic policy institutions are changes in the 
legislation whereby military personnel accused of crimes that occur in pacification 
programs will be judged by military justice rather than normal, civilian justice.  
These are all major changes, for the worse, in terms of military prerogatives, and 
thus civilian control of the armed forces.  These might be short-term changes in that 
with another president after the elections in October 2018, these important security 
positions could again be filled by civilians. However, the MOD was never really 
staffed by civilians, and the GSI, until it was disbanded between 2014 and 2016, was 
always under the leadership of a general, and the precedent of staffing of what were 
civilian positions by senior military officers is very serious.  
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What is very unlikely to change, and can have an ongoing impact is both the 
creation of the Ministry of Security, (Ministério Extraordinário da Segurança 
Pública) now headed by Raul Jungmann, who was previously the Minister of 
Defense, and the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro.  The interventor, [one who 
intervenes] designated by President Michel Tamer, is an army general and 
essentially the Brazilian army is now in charge of security, including control over 
the Polícia Militar, or state police, and the prisons, in Rio de Janeiro.  The media 
reports that this military intervention may be extended to other cities and states.  21 
Utilizing the same table of prerogatives, and updating those changed by 
recent decisions by President Michel Temer regarding the Brazilian military, will 
better document the regression in democratic civil-military relations. The most 
relevant ones, while all to a great or lesser degree regress, are 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, and ll.   
 Prerogative #2: Military relationship to the chief executive. Stepan writes that this 
prerogative is low when “The Chief executive (president, prime minister, or 
constitutional monarch) is de jure and de facto commander-in-chief.” (Stepan 1988:94)  
This was Low in Brazil in 2014. Since 1985 all of the presidents of Brazil  have been 
civilians. Since 1989 the presidents have been elected by the population in national 
elections every four years.  However, President Roussef was impeached in August 2016, 
and vice-president Michel Temer, also accused of corruption, assumed the presidency. 
The Ministry of Defense, was headed by a civilian between its creation in 1999 and 
February 2018 when General Silva e Luna was appointed as MOD by President Temer. 
Today this prerogative would be High.  
 Prerogative #4: Active duty military participation in the Cabinet. This prerogative 
is low, in Stepan’s analysis, when there is normally no active duty military participation 
in the Cabinet.   This rating was Low in Brazil in 2014.  None of the 27 members of the 
cabinet, were military. Today the Minister of Defense is a general. Of the fourteen 
officials in the expanded cabinet, the head of the Secretariat for Institutional Security, 
GSI, is a member of the military, as is the National Secretary of Public Security, and the 
Chief Secretary of the Civil Cabinet (Casa Civil).  Today this prerogative is High.  
 Prerogative #6: Role of senior career civil servants or civilian political appointees.  
To Stepan, this prerogative is low when a “Professional cadre of highly informed civil 
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servants or policy-making civilian political appointees play a major role in assisting [the] 
executive branch in designing and implementing defense and national security policy.” In 
2014 this prerogative was Moderate.  The civilian bureaucracy in Brazil is unequivocally 
strong. However, as there is no civilian career, nor the required concurso [public 
academic competition], in the MOD---and with the paucity of civilians with expertise---
the military fills a vacuum and thereby assumes larger roles in the MOD itself.  The 
Planning Ministry is the entity that could create civilian career positions, but it has not 
done so to date, alleging the lack of funds.  From what we have been able to determine, 
the issue is mostly financial, and not political. Today, with the Minister himself a general, 
and with other generals in key positions – GSI, FUNAI, Casa Civil, and Public Security, 
this prerogative is High.  
 Prerogative #7: Role in intelligence.  For Stepan, this prerogative is low when 
“Peak intelligence agencies [are] de jure and defacto controlled by civilian chains of 
command.”  In addition, there are “Strong civilian review boards.”  This prerogative is 
was Moderate in 2014.  The Serviço Nacional de Informações (SNI) National 
Information Service, which was the military regime’s intelligence service, was abolished 
by President Collor in 1990.  The Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (ABIN), the 
Brazilian Intelligence Agency, which is led by a civilian who is nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate, replaced it, in 1999. In 2015 & 2016 ABIN 
reported directly to the president.  Today, the GSI has been recreated, ABIN reports to 
the Minister Chief of the GSI, who is a general officer in the Brazilian Army. Then too, 
the Brazilian Military Intelligence system is generally intact.  Today this prerogative is 
high.  
 Prerogative #8: Role in police.  This prerogative is low when, according to 
Stepan, “Police [are] under control of nonmilitary ministry or local officials”, and there 
are “No active-duty military allowed to command a police unit.”  In 2014 this prerogative 
was Moderate. The control of the Polícia Militar (PM), or Military Police, is a state 
responsibility, under the democratically elected civilian governors of the states. The 
Polícia Federal (PF), or Federal Police, is under the Ministry of Justice. The domestic 
roles of the armed forces in Brazil are defined in the Constitution of 1988, in Article 142, 
and in subsequent laws. The conditions are very precisely defined in Complementary 
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Law 97 of June 9, 1999. Specifically, a state governor, who is responsible for security in 
the state, can request of the President of the Republic that the armed forces be used to 
support the police. In February of 2018 President Temer named General Braga Netto as 
interventor for security in the State of Rio de Janeiro. This is the first intervention under 
the constitution of 1988, and President Temer could have named a civilian. The 
intervention is distinct from, and far more serious, than the frequent deployment of the 
Brazilian armed forces under Article 142, of the 1988 Constutution, which provides for 
the military to guarantee law and order (GLO).  
 In addition, the Brazilian armed forces have police powers along the border, to a 
distance of 150 kilometers from the border.  This police power is exercised especially in 
the Amazon, where the Brazilian Army is often the sole representative of the State along 
the porous borders.  The total amount of land that corresponds to the 150-kilometer 
corridor is actually larger than any other single country in South America, with the 
exception of Argentina. This prerogative is High today.    
  Prerogative #11: Role in legal system. According to Stepan, this 
prerogative is low when the “Military have almost no legal jurisdiction outside of 
narrowly defined internal offenses against military discipline.  In all areas outside this 
domain, civilians and military are subject to civil laws and civil courts. In 2014 this rating 
was Low as the as the military’s legal system was changing.  Today, however, the 
military still have their own legal system, and in October of 2017 President Temer 
decreed the law that transferred from civil law to military law crimes committed by 
military personnel during public security operations.  Consequently, this prerogative is 
Moderate today.  
 Whereas in 2014, the ratings on the 11 prerogatives were 6 low and 5 moderate, 
with no highs, today, in early 2018 it is 3 low, 3 moderate, and 5 high.  
These presidential decisions, illustrated by these 11 prerogatives, can have 
very serious and long-lasting negative consequences.  They must be seen in terms of 
political dynamics.  As stated by ex-president and famous political sociologist, 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “it is mainly weak governments that end up appealing 
for military [support]” 22  President Michel Temer apparently wants to run for 
election for the presidency in October 2018. Public security is his platform for these 
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elections. President Tamer has suffered a major political setback in his inability to 
reform the pension system, and one of the leading candidates for the presidency is 
Jair Bolsonaro who is very conservative and retired military officer. Furthermore, in 
a recent survey, when asked to evaluate the administration of President Temer, 
whereas in July 2016 14% said good or excellent, in January 2018 this figure was 
6%; on the other hand, whereas in July 2016 31% said bad or terrible in January 
2018 this was 70%. 23  In the most recent poll for the October presidential elctions, 
including simulations, and illustrated below of 11 potential candidates, Temer had 
the third from the bottom support at 0.9%, and by far the highest rejection rate, at 
88%. 24 
 
First Round 25 
  
Candidate/Party                      _(A)_              _(B)_.             Rejection 
  
Lula (PT)                               33.4%                - -                       46.7% 
Haddad (PT)                           - -                2.3% 
Bolsonaro (PSC)                    16.8%              20.0%                  50.4% 
Marina (Rede)                        7.8%              12.8%                  53.9% 
Alckmin (PSDB)                     6.4%                8.6%                  50.7% 
C. Gomes (PDT)                     4.3%                8.1%                  47.8% 
A. Dias (Podemos)                 3.3%                4.0%                   
Collor (PTC)                            1.2%                2.1% 
Temer (MDB)                         0.9%                1.3%                  88.0% 
M. D’Ávila (PCdoB)               0.7%                1.3% 
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R. Maia (DEM)                       0.6%                0.8%                  55.8% 
Blank/Null                            18.2%              28.2% 




 Michel Temer is, in short, a VERY unpopular president who also carries a 
huge amount of baggage for graft and corruption.   He, like all politicians in Brazil, is 
aware that public security is by far the most important issue concerning the 
population.  In addition, according to all public opinion polls, the military, in steep 
contrast to politicians, is highly regarded. Even before the most recent, since 2016, 
scandals, whereas in 2014 44% of the population trusted the president and 43% the 
federal government, 62% trusted the military. And, in a World Values Survey 
whereas 58.6% stated they had confidence in the armed forces 41% had confidence 
in the government. 26 Further, according to a very credible poll by IPEA, when asked 
about using the military for public security, whereas 92% said always or in some 
situations (47% + 45%) only 8% said never. 27 
 Conclusion 
 The 1988 Constitution in Brazil was formulated by politicians who sought to 
guarantee their own welfare. In the intervening decades the prerogatives of the 
Brazilian military were gradually reduced, thereby increasing the control of civilians 
over the military.  The strategic landscape and domestic politics have never 
required military effectiveness, and the civilian politicians, while utilizing rhetoric to 
the contrary, never provided strategy, institutions, nor resources that could result in 
military effectiveness.  The nature of the political institutions, in combination with  
a culture of impunity, resulted in massive graft and corruption. Due to a series 
domestic and international factors, however, a robust set of accountability 
mechanisms emerged which has resulted in massive penalties for corrupt 
politicians, bureaucrats, and prominent businessmen.  In this context, when even 
the current president, who took office on the impeachment of the elected president 
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in August 2016, defined public security as the main issue of concern to the Brazilian 
population, he turned to the only security institution with its reputation intact, the 
Brazilian military, to take on important roles in all levels of government in 
attempting to achieve public security.   The challenge will be, in view of the lack of a 
demand for an external role, and the weakness of the institutions of civilian control 
of the military, whether civilian control can be reasserted in a future political 
context.   
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